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In this paper we study a particular game where Sender chooses a signal  whose realization is
observed by Receiver who then takes her action. In Subsection 2.3 we made an observation that
Sender's gain from persuasion is weakly greater in this game than in any other communication
game. In this section of the Online Appendix we provide a formal statement and proof of this
claim. To do so, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism.
As before, Receiver has a continuous utility function u(a;!) that depends on her action a 2 A
and the state of the world ! 2 
. Sender has a continuous utility function v (a;!) that depends on
Receiver's action and the state of the world. Sender and Receiver share a prior 0 2 int((
)).
Let a () denote the set of actions that maximize Receiver's expected utility given her belief is .
We assume that there are at least two actions in A and that for any action a there exists a  s.t.
a () = fag. The action space A is compact and the state space 
 is nite. We will relax the
latter assumption in Section 3.
A persuasion mechanism (;c) is a combination of a signal and a message technology. Sender's
private signal  consists of a nite realization space S and a family of distributions f (j!)g!2
 over
S. A message technology c consists of a nite message space M and a family of functions c(js) :
1M ! R+ ; c(mjs) denotes the cost to Sender of sending message m after receiving signal realization
s.1 The assumptions that S and M are nite are without loss of generality (cf. Proposition 4) and
are used solely for notational convenience.
A persuasion mechanism denes a game. The timing is as follows. First, nature selects ! from

 according to 0. Neither Sender nor Receiver observe nature's move. Then, Sender privately
observes a realization s 2 S from  (j!) and chooses a message m 2 M. Finally, Receiver observes
m and chooses an action a 2 A. Sender's payo is v (a;!) c(mjs) and Receiver's payo is u(a;!).
We represent the Sender's and Receiver's (possibly stochastic) strategies by  and , respectively.
We use (!jm) to denote Receiver's posterior belief that the state is ! after observing m.
A few examples help clarify the varieties of games that are captured by the denition of a
persuasion mechanism. If  is perfectly informative, M = R+, and c(mjs) = m=s, the mechanism
is Michael A. Spence's (1973) education signalling game. If  is perfectly informative and c is
constant, the mechanism is a cheap talk game as in Vincent Crawford and Joel Sobel (1982). If
 is arbitrary and c is constant, the mechanism coincides with the information-transmission game
of Jerry R. Green and Nancy L. M. Stokey (2007). If  is perfectly informative and c(mjs) =
 (m   s)
2, the mechanism is a communication game with lying costs developed in Navin Kartik
(2009). If  is perfectly informative, M = P (
), and c(mjs) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if s 2 m
1 if s = 2 m
, the mechanism is
a persuasion game as in Sanford J. Grossman (1981) and Paul Milgrom (1981).2
A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a persuasion mechanism is a triplet (;;) satisfying the
usual conditions. We also apply an additional equilibrium selection criterion: we focus on Sender-
preferred equilibria, i.e., equilibria where the expectation of v (a;!)   c(mjs) is the greatest. For
the remainder of this appendix, we use the term \equilibrium" to mean a Sender-preferred perfect
1R+ denotes the anely extended non-negative real numbers: R+ = R+ [ f1g. Allowing c to take on the value
of 1 is useful for characterizing the cases where Sender cannot lie and cases where he must reveal all his information.
2P (X) denotes the set of all subsets of X.
2Bayesian equilibrium of a persuasion mechanism.3 We denote Sender's equilibrium action when
her belief is  by ^ a().4
We dene the value of a mechanism to be the equilibrium expectation of v (a;!)   c(mjs).
The gain from a mechanism is the dierence between its value and the equilibrium expectation
of v (a;!) when Receiver obtains no information. Sender benets from persuasion if there is a
mechanism with a strictly positive gain. A mechanism is optimal if no other mechanism has higher
value.
The game we study in the paper is closely related to persuasion mechanism where M = S and
c(mjs) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
k if s 2 m
1 if s = 2 m
for some k 2 R+. We call such mechanisms honest. Specically, the
game we study in the paper is one where Sender chooses among the set of all honest mechanisms.
With these denitions in hand, we can formally state and prove the aforementioned observation
from Subsection 2.3.
Proposition 1. For any v 2 R, there exists a persuasion mechanism with value v if and only if
there exists an honest mechanism with value v.
Proof. The "if" part of the claim is immediate. To see the "only if" part, consider an equilibrium
"o = (o;o;o) of some mechanism (o;co) with value v. Let Ao be the set of actions induced
with positive probability in "o, and for any a 2 Ao, let Ma be the set of messages which induce




s2S o (mjs)o (sj!),
and c(mjs) equal to the ex ante expected messaging costs under "o if m = s and  1 otherwise.
Reporting truthfully is clearly an equilibrium strategy for Sender. Because a was an optimal
response for Receiver to each m 2 Ma in "o, it must also be an optimal response to the message
3For some mechanisms it might seem more suitable to focus on sequential, rather than merely perfect Bayesian,
equilibria. Given that we examine Sender-preferred equilibria, however, this distinction will not be particularly
relevant.
4If both Sender and Receiver are indierent between two actions at a given belief, we focus on equilibria where
Receiver takes a deterministic action.
3a in the proposed honest mechanism, so the distribution of Receiver's actions conditional on the
state is the same as in "o. Since the expected messaging costs are also the same as in "o, the value
of the honest mechanism is exactly v.
2 Veriable messages
In Subsection 2.3 we also made an observation that it is not important to assume that Sender must
truthfully report realization s from .
Specically, if we instead assume that Sender observes s privately and then sends a veriable
message about s, the same information is revealed in equilibrium and we obtain the same outcome.
As before, Receiver has a continuous utility function u(a;!) that depends on her action a 2 A and
the state of the world ! 2 
. Sender has a continuous utility function v (a;!) that depends on
Receiver's action and the state of the world. Sender and Receiver share a prior 0 2 int((
)).
The action space A is compact and the state space 
 is nite. In this section, we assume that
Receiver has a unique optimal action a () at every belief. When this assumption is not satised,
the equivalence of the outcomes with veriable messages can be guaranteed by introducing a small
amount of private information for Receiver, so that the distribution of Receiver's optimal actions
is uniquely determined conditional on .
Given A, 
, 0, u, and v, we dene two games. Let  be the set of all signals on 
 with a
nite realization space S. The baseline game is the game we study in the paper. Sender chooses
a signal  2 . Receiver observes Sender's choice of the signal and the signal realization s 2 S,
forms her beliefs, and then takes her action. Denote Sender's strategy by  2 (). A strategy 
is an equilibrium if and only if each  in its support induces a  2 argmax E (^ v ()).
The other game we refer to as the veriable message game. Sender chooses a signal . Receiver
observes Sender's choice of the signal. Sender privately observes a signal realization s from the
4signal. He then sends a message m 2 P (S) s.t. s 2 m. Receiver observes the message, forms her




denote a strategy for Sender. This consists
of a possibly stochastic choice of signal  2 () and a messaging policy  : S ! (P (S))
following each signal . Let  denote the truthful messaging policy, i.e.,  (s) puts probability
one on fsg for all s. Let ~ (m) 2 (S) denote Receiver's belief about the signal realization observed
by Sender when she sees message m. The support of ~ (m) must be m. Each belief ~ (m) implies
a unique belief  about !. A pair (; ~ ) is a (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium if and only if ~  obeys
Bayes' rule on the equilibrium path and  is a best response to ~  at every information set.
In both games, we refer to the equilibrium distribution of Receiver's beliefs conditional on the
state as the equilibrium outcome. We can now formally state our claim from Subsection 2.3:
Proposition 2. The set of equilibrium outcomes of the baseline game and the set of equilibrium
outcomes of the veriable message game coincide.
Let V G denote the subgame of the veriable message game following Sender's choice of . A
(perfect Bayesian) equilibrium of the subgame V G is a pair (; ~ ). Standard arguments ensure
that for any , such an equilibrium of V G exists.
Lemma 1. Suppose  is an equilibrium of the baseline game. Then for each  in the support of 
there exists an equilibrium of V G in which  = .
Proof. Consider some equilibrium  of the baseline game and some  in the support of . There
exists an equilibrium (; ~ ) of V G. It will suce to show that given ~ , Sender's payo from
 must be the same as his payo from  following any s. Dene these payos to be y (s) and
y (s) respectively.
Since (; ~ ) is an equilibrium, we must have y (s)  y (s)8s. Moreover, because Sender can
choose a signal 0 in the baseline game to induce any Bayes-plausible distribution of Receiver's
5beliefs, he can in particular choose a 0 that produces the same distribution of Receiver's beliefs
as (; ~ ) . Sender's expected payo in the baseline game following 0 must be the same as his
payo in V G, which is Ey (s). Since  is played in an equilibrium of the baseline game, we must
have Ey (s)  Ey (s). Given y (s)  y (s)8s, this implies y (s) = y (s)8s.
With Lemma 1, it is straightforward to establish one direction of Proposition 2.
Lemma 2. Any equilibrium outcome of the baseline game is an equilibrium outcome of the veriable
message game.
Proof. Consider any equilibrium  of the baseline game with outcome . Let v denote Sender's
payo in this equilibrium. We construct an equilibrium (^ ; ^ ) of the veriable message game as
follows. First, specify that ^  chooses signals according to  at the initial node, and set  = 
for all  in the support of . Note that the outcome of the veriable message game under this
strategy is . Impose further that ^  is consistent with Bayes rule on the equilibrium path given
these strategies. To construct o-equilibrium messaging policies ()= 2Supp(), consider for each






of V G. Set  = 
eq and set ^  = ~ 
eq at nodes following .
Because each 
eq is an equilibrium of V G, we know that ^  is a best response to ^  at all
information sets following each . Consider, then, the rst node at which Sender chooses . For
any 0, let v0 be Sender's payo if she chooses 0 followed by the  prescribes by ^ . By Proposition
1 in the paper, we know that Sender could have chosen a signal in the baseline game that would
have generated the same distribution of posteriors and thus also yielded payo v0. Because  is
an equilibrium of the baseline game, any  2 Supp() followed by  must yield a payo weakly
higher than v0 for all 0. This implies that ^  is a best response to ^  at the initial information set
of the veriable message game.
It remains to establish the following Lemma:
6Lemma 3. Any equilibrium outcome of the veriable message game is an equilibrium outcome of
the baseline game.





with outcome . Let v be Sender's payo in this equilibrium. Let v0 denote Sender's payo in
if he deviates to 0 followed by 0
. Let v
0 denote Sender's payo if he deviates to 0 followed
by . We know (i) v  v080 (by the fact that  is an equilibrium); (ii) v0  v
0 (by the fact
that 0
was a best response at the information sets following 0). By Proposition 1 in the paper,
we know that there exists a ^  such that playing ^  in the baseline game yields sender payo v and
produces outcome . Since for any 0 Sender's payo in the baseline game from choosing 0 is v
0,
inequalities (i) and (ii) imply that ^  is an equilibrium of the baseline game.
Lemmas 2 and 3 jointly establish Proposition 2.
3 Relaxing the assumption that 
 is nite
In the paper, we assumed that 
 is nite. We also claimed this assumption was made primarily
for expositional convenience. In this section, we show that the approach used in the paper extends
to the case when 
 is a compact metric space.5
As before, Receiver has a continuous utility function u(a;!) that depends on her action a 2 A
and the state of the world ! 2 
. Sender has a continuous utility function v (a;!) that depends
on Receiver's action and the state of the world. The action space A is assumed to be compact
and the state space 
 is assumed to be a compact metric space. Let (
) denote the set of Borel
probabilities on 
, a compact metric space in the weak* topology. Sender and Receiver share a
prior 0 2 (
).
5We are very grateful to Max Stinchcombe for help with this extension.
7A persuasion mechanism is a combination of a signal and a message technology. A signal (;S)
consists of a compact metric realization space S and a measurable function  : [0;1] ! 
  S,
x 7! (1 (x);2 (x)). Note that we dene  to be a measurable function whose second component
(i.e., the signal realization) is correlated with !. We assume that x is uniformly distributed on
[0;1] and that Sender observes 2 (x).
We denote a realization of 2 (x) by s. Note that since S is a compact metric space (hence,
complete and separable), there exists a regular conditional probability (i.e., a posterior probability)
obtained by conditioning on 2 (x) = s (A. N. Shiryaev 1996, p.230). A message technology c
consists of a message space M and a family of functions

c(js) : M ! R+
	
s2S. As before, a
mechanism is honest if M = S and c(mjs) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
k if s 2 m
1 if s = 2 m
for some k 2 R+. A persuasion
mechanism denes a game just as before. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is still the solution concept
and we still select Sender-preferred equilibria. Denitions of value and gain are same as before.
Let a () denote the set of actions optimal for Receiver given her beliefs are  2 (
):




Note that a () is an upper hemicontinuous, non-empty valued, compact valued, correspondence
from (
) to A:
Let ^ v () denote the maximum expected value of v if Receiver takes an action in a ():




Since a () is non-empty and compact and

v (a;!)d(!) is continuous in a, ^ v is well dened.
We rst show that the main ingredient for the existence of an optimal mechanism, namely the
8upper semicontinuity of ^ v, remains true in this setting.
Proof. ^ v is upper semicontinuous.
Given any a, the random variable v (a;!) is dominated by the constant random variable
max! v (a;!) (since v is continuous in ! and 
 is compact, the maximum is attained). Hence, by
the Lebesgue's Dominated Convergence Theorem,

v (a;!)d(!) is continuous in  for any given
a. Now, suppose that ^ v is discontinuous at some . Since u is continuous, by Berge's Maximum
Theorem this means that Receiver must be indierent between a set of actions at , i.e., a () is
not a singleton. By denition, however, ^ v ()  maxa2a()

v (a;!)d(!).
Hence, ^ v is upper semicontinuous.
Now, a distribution of posteriors, denoted by , is an element of the set ((
)), the set of
Borel probabilities on the compact metric space (




) d () = 0. We say that  induces  if conditioning on 2 (x) = s gives
posterior s and the distribution of 2(x) is  given that x is uniformly distributed: Since 
 is
a compact metric space, for any Bayes-plausible  there exists a  that induces it.6 Hence, the












d () = 0.
Now, let
V  supfzj(;z) 2 co(hyp(^ v))g;
where co() denotes the convex hull and hyp() denotes the hypograph. Recall that given a subset
K of an arbitrary vector space, co(K) is dened as \fCjK  C, C convexg. Let g (0) denote
6Personal communication with Max Stinchcombe. Detailed proof available upon request.
9the subset of ((












^ v()d () = V (0)
)
:
Note that we still have not established that g (0) is non-empty. That is the primary task of the
proof of our main proposition.
Proposition 3. An optimal mechanism exists. The value of an optimal mechanism is V (0).
Sender benets from persuasion i V (0) > ^ v (0). An honest mechanism with a signal that
induces an element of g (0) is optimal.
Proof. By construction of V , there can be no mechanism with value strictly greater than V (0).
We need to show there exists a mechanism with value equal to V (0), or equivalently, that g (0)
is not empty. Without loss of generality, suppose the range of v is [0;1]. Consider the set H =
f(;z) 2 hyp(V )jz  0g. Since ^ v is upper semicontinuous, H is compact. By construction of V ,
H is convex. Therefore, by Choquet's Theorem (e.g., Robert R. Phelps 2001), for any (0;z0) 2 H,
there exists a probability measure  s.t. (0;z0) =

H (;z)d (;z) with  supported by extreme
points of H. In particular, there exists  s.t. (0;V (0)) =

H (;z)d (;z) with  supported
by extreme points of H: Now, note that if (;z) is an extreme point of H, then V () = ^ v ();
moreover, if z > 0, z = V () = ^ v (). Hence, we can nd an  s.t. (0;V (0)) =

H (;z)d (;z)
with support of  entirely within f(; ^ v ())j 2 (
)g. Therefore, there exists a  2 g (0).
4 Bound on the size of S
In footnote 7, we claimed that jSj need not exceed minfjAj;j
jg. Proposition 1 implies that there
exists an optimal signal with jSj  jAj. Hence, we only need to establish the following:
Proposition 4. There exists an optimal mechanism with jSj  j
j:
10Proof. Since ^ v is bounded, hyp(^ v) is path-connected. Therefore, it is connected. The Fenchel-
Bunt Theorem (Hiriart-Urruty and Lemar echal 2004, Thm 1.3.7) states that if S  Rn has no
more than n connected components (in particular, if S is connected), then any x 2 co(S) can be
expressed as a convex combination of n elements of S. Hence, since hyp(^ v)  Rj
j, any element
of co(hyp(^ v)) can be expressed as a convex combination of j
j elements of hyp(^ v). In particular,
(0;V (0)) 2 co(hyp(^ v)) can be expressed a convex combination of j
j elements of hyp(^ v). This
further implies that (0;V (0)) can be expressed as a convex combination of j
j elements of the
graph of ^ v. Hence, there exists an optimal straightforward mechanism which induces a distribution
of posteriors whose support has no more than j
j elements.
5 Monotonicity of ^ v and optimality of worst beliefs
In Section 5.1, we observed that when Sender's payos are monotonic in Receiver's beliefs, there is
a sense in which Sender always induces the worst belief consistent with a given action. Here we
formalize that claim.
Say that ^ v is monotonic if for any , 0, ^ v ( + (1   )0) is monotonic in . When ^ v is
monotonic in , it is meaningful to think about beliefs that are better or worse from Sender's
perspective. The simplest denition would be that  is worse than 0 if ^ v ()  ^ v (0). Note,
however, that because v (a;!) depends on ! directly, whether  is worse in this sense depends both
on how Receiver's action changes at  and how  aects Sender's expected utility directly. It turns
out that for our result we need a denition of worse that isolates the way beliefs aect Receiver's
actions.
When ^ v is monotonic, there is a rational relation on A dened by a % a0 if ^ v ()  ^ v (0)
whenever a = ^ a() and a0 = ^ a(0). This relation on A implies a partial order on (
): say that









for any a % a0. In other words, a belief is higher in this partial order if it makes better actions
(from Sender's perspective) more desirable for Receiver. The order is partial since a belief might
make both a better and a worse action more desirable for Receiver. We say that  is a worst belief
inducing ^ a() if there is no 0 C  s.t. ^ a() = ^ a(0). We then have the following:
Proposition 5. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. If ^ v is monotonic, A is nite, and Sender benets
from persuasion, then for any interior belief  induced by an optimal mechanism either: (i)  is a
worst belief inducing ^ a(), or (ii) both Sender and Receiver are indierent between two actions at
.
Proof. Suppose Assumption 1 holds, ^ v is monotonic, A is nite, and Sender benets from persua-
sion. Now, suppose  is an interior belief induced by an optimal mechanism. Since Assumption 1
holds and Sender benets from persuasion, Receiver's preference at  is not discrete by Proposition
6. Therefore, Lemma 1 tells us 9a such that Eu(^ a();!) = Eu(a;!): If (ii) does not hold, we
know Ev(^ a();!) > Ev(a;!). Therefore, ^ a() % a. Hence, given any 0 C ,
0 = Eu(^ a();!)   Eu(a;!) > E0u(^ a();!)   E0u(a;!):
Since E0u(a;!) > E0u(^ a();!), we know that ^ a() is not Receiver's optimal action when her
beliefs are .
Hence, for any 0 C , ^ a(0) 6= ^ a(), which means that  is a worst belief inducing ^ a().
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